Friday, May 20, 2005
By casting over 57% of their votes in favour of BC-STV, just short of the threshold required for approval, British Columbians have embraced electoral reform without fully committing to a system that was either too radical or too complicated for many citizens. This result is unsurprising, since one of the constraints on the mandate of the Citizens’ Assembly was that it could only make a single recommendation to the electorate. The general question of the desirability of institutional change, about which I believe there is consensus, became conflated with discussion of the merits a particular unique proposal, about which there is much uncertainty and disagreement. No one really knows to what extent BC-STV (as opposed to the idea of reform) has been endorsed by the B.C. electorate.
Both Premier Gordon Campbell and Leader of the Opposition Carole James appear willing to carry the reform process further, so as to not relinquish the leading role that British Columbia has played in electoral reform. Logic and civic duty require that they do so within certain parameters that respect both the reasons given by the Citizens Assembly for its recommendation, and the various reasons why the 60% threshold was not met.
Accepting these parameters yields three options. First, we can correct the most serious flaw in the referendum process by devoting more time and resources to educating the public about the pros and cons of our existing single-member plurality (SMP)system and BC-STV, and then have a re-run of the referendum.
The trouble with this suggestion is that it throws us back on the horns of a dilemma between a status-quo that has been rejected and a novel system with too many drawbacks—such as vast ridings in the north and long ballots in the south. We are forced to choose between the low proportionality of SMP, which almost always yields majority government provincially, and the high proportionality of BC-STV, which almost never will. B.C. voters are offered no middle ground.
These considerations lead to the second option. The referendum result can be interpreted as endorsing the general principle of greater voter sovereignty as expressed by STV, but not endorsing a system change as radical as BC-STV. We may therefore wish to adopt a more modest proposal. Taking some of the geographically largest constituencies out of the mix (and keeping them as single–or double-member ridings), it becomes practicable to simply and equitably divide the rest of the province into 24 or 25 3-member STV districts. “STV-Lite” would offer less over-all proportionality than BC-STV, but that would arguably be a virtue. Proportionality for smaller parties in many PR-systems has all too often given them disproportional power. Most British Columbians would undoubtedly support raising the bar for achieving a majority government (typically around 38-39% of the total popular vote, and just 36% in the recent British election), in order to create more inclusive, moderate and representative governments, without completely throwing the majority government baby out with the bath water.
The third option would be a modest type of Mixed-Member Plurality (MMP). The Citizens’ Assembly rejected MMP because in order to achieve proportionality in a legislature limited to 79 seats, voters would be required to choose between province-wide party lists, and single-member constituencies would have to be nearly doubled in size. This led to a litany of criticisms of MMP: that it meant overly large constituencies, excessive central party control, “two classes of MLAs” , and comparative lack of voter choice.
However, being less ambitious about proportionality could permit a version of MMP that is far more attractive. Consider the following example. British Columbia could return, as nearly as possible, to the same 57 single-member, first-past-the post constituencies that it had over 20 years ago. This would guarantee a level of local representation to which British Columbians are accustomed. The remaining 22 seats could then be allocated among five 4- or 5-member regional districts (two in the Lower Mainland, and the others on Vancouver Island and in the southern and northern interior). Crucially, these regional seats would be open-list (voters would be able to rank the candidates on the party list in order of preference). This combination of regionality and open list ballot structure would improve voter choice and ensure that list members continue to serve local constituencies. Partial proportional representation in the form of “regional, open –list MMP” would achieve a similar degree of modestly-improved proportionality as STV-lite, but would be friendlier to political parties as aggregators of interests and crucibles of policy. Given the prophylactic effect that party discipline can have upon the influence of narrow and parochial pressure groups, that may not be such a bad thing.
How do we choose between these various options? Let us have a two-part referendum process that separates the general question of reform from the specifics of particular reforms. The first part would be a question asking citizens whether they want a new, more proportional electoral system. This should easily meet the required 60% level of approval that was narrowly missed on May 17, as well as clearing the hurdle of majority approval in 60% of constituencies. The second part of the referendum would give voters a choice between all three of the options described above (BC-STV, STV-lite and regional, open-list MMP). To avoid conflict of interest, the specifics of each of these three options could be spelled out further by a reconstituted Citizens’ Assembly. British Columbia will then truly have become the model of democratic reform for the entire country.
Tuesday, May 10, 2005
I recently heard someone say that back in 1998, 17,000 people left British Columbia in search of economic opportunities elsewhere. While this remark was intended as a criticism of the NDP, it reminded me of the pervasive tendency in politics to focus on short-term fluctuations in unemployment and economic activity instead of a more important measure of our economic well-being and policy—our standard of living. This distinction between total GDP and average income appears quite academic. But if we succeed in raising employment through a lower wage, or in raising incomes in a particular sector, or in drawing a lot of labour from the rest of Canada, but do not raise the average incomes of British Columbians and Canadians in the process, then what have we actually accomplished?
In 1986 UBC economist Robert C. Allen wrote an important article on the history of the B.C. economy, which asked this very question. His answer contained a perceptive critique of the Social Credit economic policies of the time . The essence of the Social Credit strategy in the early and mid-1980s was to promote growth by cutting social and education spending, thereby freeing monies to create “real jobs” through tax cuts, “Special Enterprise Zones”, and multi-billion dollar investments in megaprojects like the Northeast Coal Project ,the Coquihalla Highway, the Site C dam and Expo 86. Professor Allen showed that although government-induced economic surges directly increased B.C.’s exports and GDP, that they were not as likely to raise GDP per capita. In the case of Northeast Coal, profits from mining and shipping coal and the rise in real estate values in Tumbler Ridge were outweighed by the cost of drawing half a billion dollars from provincial general revenue. Allen concluded that such unprofitable megaprojects lowered average income, and that a fixation upon commodity exports and secondary manufacturing were diverting attention and resources away from policies that would be more effective in raising economic welfare-- such as increased spending to fight unemployment, helping resource communities to adjust to technical change, and expansion of educational services, especially in the areas outside of greater Vancouver and Victoria.
A fascinating part of Professor Allen’s analysis was its illumination of B.C.’s polarized politics, showing how important constituencies of both the right and the left had benefited financially from rapid subsidized growth. These included developers and owners of residential property in the vicinity of subsidized projects, along with the members of leading private sector unions in affected industries.
How well does this picture describe B.C. in subsequent years? While the NDP’s commitment to maintain health and education spending through the 1990s might have been an improvement over Socred restraint, Glen Clark’s attempts to increase the number of well-paying blue-collar union jobs in the forest, construction and ship-building trades through such devices as the Jobs and Timber Accord and the Fast Ferries project epitomized the left side of the coin that Professor Allen described. They were just as unsuccessful at raising average incomes as Bill Bennett’s most notorious boondoggles.
Premier Campbell’s background as a real estate developer and his Expo-like focus on 2010 naturally invite comparison with Bill Bennett. The tax and service cuts in Campbell’s first three years in office are reminiscent of the Socred restraint era, but there are also important differences. For one thing, the Liberals probably have a broader concept of economic diversification than did the Socreds. By ending appurtenancy (which guaranteed the local processing of timber) they have shown that they are no longer as wedded to the conventional theory that stresses secondary manufacturing as the sine qua non of economic development. They also demonstrate a deeper appreciation of the importance of human capital than did the Socreds, by continuing the NDP’s expansion of post-secondary education, particularly in the interior of the province, although the raising of fees and cancellation of grants have adversely affected cost and access for students.
But in doing everything he politically can to stimulate economic activity, Premier Campbell has been far too indiscriminate. His application of supply-side tax cuts and their predictable consequences for revenue, the tortuous saga of B.C. Rail, and his would-be privatizations of liquor stores and the Coquihalla Highway, all smack of ideological self-indulgence colliding with political reality. Cuts to environmental protection and lax enforcement of regulations, even if they have enhanced the business climate, carry long-run costs that have not been fully accounted for. In these respects, B.C.’s new politics of economic growth still bear a disturbing resemblance to the old.
 R.C. Allen, “The B.C. Economy: Past, Present, Future,” in R.C. Allen and G. Rosenbluth, Restraining the Economy: Social Credit Economic Policies for B.C. in the Eighties. Vancouver: New Star Book, 1986, 9-42.
Sunday, May 01, 2005
I have created this "blog" as a place to house my weekly or bi-weekly commentaries on public affairs, with a focus on British Columbian and Canadian politics and public policy. Some of these columns may have previously appeared in newspapers or have been referred to in my media commentaries. I have frequently been interviewed or consulted by journalists on CBC radio and television and in newspapers, including the Globe and Mail, The Georgia Straight, and the Prince George Citizen.
Other columns are either too rough or too esoteric to have been published elsewhere; they may nonetheless prove useful to many people who are studying issues ranging from electoral reform to trade policy.